Comparative Study of Corruption by Fuzzy Method with Emphasis on Oil Rentier Governments

Document Type : Original Research

Authors
A. saei 1
A. doroudian 2
1 Associate Professor
2 PHD Student of Political sociology in Tarbiat modares univesity
Abstract
Introduction

The subject of this research is corruption, which has been studied in 176 countries in 1996 to 2019. The problem of the this writing is that the scores of the control of corruption index in oil dependent countries are lower than non-oil dependent ones, and the variance of the control of corruption index among oil dependent countries is also significant. To explain these issues, two questions have been proposed: how the difference in corruption between oil dependent and non-oil dependent countries could be explained? How can the diversity of corruption be explained within the oil dependent countries?

Methodology & Conceptual framework

To answer this question, by adopting a unified approach, and using the theories of rentier state, neo-patrimonialism and neo-institutionalism, the research conceptual model was formulated. In response to the research questions and according to the requirements of the conceptual model, the research hypotheses were proposed in the form of four testable statements in the form of fuzzy logic. Fuzzy method was used to test research hypotheses in the field of data collection and assessment research hypotheses. Finally, the collected quantitative data was graded and the fuzzy membership was measured for every parameters. After measuring the fuzzy membership, the fuzzy relationship of these theoretical constructs was evaluated and tested in the form of individual and compound causal conditions. To theoretically explain the differences in corruption, the causal conditions of the rentier nature of the state, the quality of political institutions, the quality of economic institutions, the level of political freedom and the level of economic freedom have been used.

Results and discussion

The results of descriptive analysis show that rent dependency in the Caucasus and Central Asia, the Middle East, North Africa and South America is more significant in determining the variances of corruption and other parameters of the conceptual model. Also, the explanatory analysis of the results shows that rent incomes are more sufficient for systemic corruption and the low quality of political institutions is the most significant in determining the level of corruption among the 176 countries under investigation; the inefficiency of political institutions leads to systemic corruption in 90% of cases. Coverage index of Standard analysis shows the high importance of political institutions ineffectiveness for systemic corruption. So that 43% of corruption variances can be explained only through the inefficiency of political institutions. Another finding is the quality of economic institutions and economic freedoms do not control corruption alone. These factors together or by combining with one of the efficient political institutions or political freedoms are able to control corruption.

Keywords

Subjects

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Political Organizing of Space
Volume 5, Issue 3 - Serial Number 19
September 2023
Pages 288-310